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dward Westermarck is known but scantily in the modern 
anthropological consciousness. His name appears, if it does at all, 
usually in a passing comment or perhaps a footnote, often rather 
disparagingly.2 This, I would argue is quite wrong, all the more so as he 
fits in precisely with the topic of our conference. He is, I would say, an 
unheralded bridge between the Scottish Enlightenment and modern 
anthropology, a person whose work far from being played out, deserves 
to be at the absolute centre of our understanding of the development of 
our discipline.3 
Who then, was this Westermarck? He was, in brief, a brilliant 
Swedish-speaking Finnish anthropologist and philosopher who, having 
fallen out with the German thinkers, decided rather that he preferred 
the British. Already when a young man, he made trips to Britain, to the 
British Library, and his doctoral thesis drew heavily on his researches 
there. Expanded, it appeared in English as History of Human Marriage in 
1891. In it, there are found two arguments which resonate still today; 
that there has never been a human society in which regular bonds have 
not formed between partners, and proximity in childhood inhibits 
mating: that is, he claims to have solved the 'incest taboo'. The first was 
absolutely essential to the creation of kinship studies as we know them, 
because it removed the necessity to view human society as having 
passed through a series of historical stages, from promiscuity to 
marriage. The second, his explanation of the incest taboo, is more 
controversial but there is a growing body of evidence suggesting that 
he may be correct, as has been argued consistently for example by 
Arthur P Wolf.4 
Not just brilliant but hard-working and cordial, Westermarck 
obtained university positions quickly in Finland, but he wished to 
pursue fieldwork, arriving ultimately in Morocco, where he stayed for 
part of the year, aided in doing so by the purchase of the Swedish 
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consul's house in Tangier. He was active too, in the Independence 
movement, beginning even whilst still busy with fieldwork to travel to 
England to help create a petition to the Czar to withdraw Russian 
influence over Finland.5 His fieldwork is sometimes regarded as being 
not very useful, because it is written in effect as a regional study rather 
than one focussed in a single community, as was to become fashionable 
even during his lifetime.6 This I believe is quite wrong: it is quite true 
that the level of abstraction is greater than we are used to dealing with 
today, but the collected essays in Ritual and Belief in Morocco (1926) are 
remarkable. They give an insight into the dense religious context of life 
in North Africa that is unparalleled until Bourdieu, and to my mind 
anticipated him and even, perhaps influenced him in his conception of 
habitus.7 It is also interesting. - even if not directly relevant to my 
arguments here - that he always fully acknowledged the support he 
received from his closest informant, taking him with him back to 
Europe, and naming him as a contributor in his published work.8 
He was equally successful in creating a social base in London. He 
became a Fellow of the Royal Anthropological Institute, receiving its 
Rivers Medal, and eventually the Huxley Medal, its highest honour.9 
Sponsored by Martin White, who believed that MPs should know 
something of Sociology, he began lecturing at the LSE, eventually in 
1906 being awarded the Martin White Chair. He stayed at the LSE for 
thirty years, dividing up his time however between the LSE, Morocco, 
and Abo, in the north of Finland, where he was invited to become 
Rector of a new private, Swedish-speaking university. 
At the LSE, he became Malinowski's teacher and then friend, then 
colleague. Indeed, I have slowly come to realise the enormous influence 
that Westermarck had on Malinowski. Though this is not the subject of 
my talk today, I am clear that the topics taught and discussed by 
Westermarck, such as the analysis of social institutions or the 
relationship between the social and the biological basis of behaviour, 
later were to become fundamental to Malinowski's vision. It is also the 
case that Westermarck was teaching at the same time as Malinowski, so 
that rather than conceiving that crucial moment at the LSE as the 
'Malinowski' seminar, we should rather say the 'Anthropology 
Seminars', for the students at the time would go to both Malinowski's 
and Westermarck's seminars. Nor is it the case that Westermarck was a 
dry teacher, or distant figure. All contemporary reports, whether of his 
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teaching at Abo, or his seminars at the LSE say that he was as charming 
as he was stimulating.10  
As if this was not enough to lead us to reassess Westermarck and 
his place in the emergence of social anthropology, he also wrote three 
major works on ethics and morals. These were; The Origin and 
Development of the Moral Ideas (1906-08); Ethical Relativity (1932), and 
Christianity and Morals (1939). In them, he both attacks vigorously those 
whom he believes are seeking a spurious moral universalism, and puts 
forward his own theory for moral relativism.  
The ethnographic material for such a claim is laid out in the two 
substantial volumes of Origins. Drawing both on his fieldwork in 
Morocco, and on very extensive library researches, he divides the 
different aspects of human life that may lead to ethical conjectures into 
chapters; so that there are descriptions of suicide, marriage, celibacy, 
adultery, homosexuality, cannibalism, property, homicide, human 
sacrifice, slavery, and so on. His survey takes him into the immediate 
conclusion that there is no universally accepted ethical principle. How 
in turn then, do we explain the diversity of ethics and morals?  
Westermarck's explanation is that moral behaviour is rooted in 
emotions which he refers to as 'retributive'. By this, he means that 
emotional reactions to a given situation may become retributive when 
they result in an identification with another person's actions, whether 
positively or negatively. In this work, 
 
(T)he theory was laid down that the moral concepts, which form 
the predicates of moral judgements, are ultimately based on moral 
emotions, that they are essentially generalisations of tendencies in 
certain phenomena to call forth either indignation or approval...We 
found that the moral emotions belong to a wider class of emotions, 
which may be described as retributive; that moral disapproval is a 
kind of resentment, akin to anger, and that moral approval is a kind 
of retributive kindly emotion, akin to gratitude.11 
 
We should note that though the emotional reaction is experienced 
subjectively it is at the same time collective, shaped by the institutions 
of society. Ethical behaviour can therefore only be understood in terms 
of an interaction between society and the individual, and can only be 
induced if an individual has the capacity to feel empathy or sympathy 
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for their interlocutor. For Westermarck, in becoming moral, it does not 
just draw on collective understandings, but assumes an almost 
disinterested quality, so that the ethical judgement becomes a reflection 
upon the interaction independently of the individual concerned:  
 
Society is the birthplace of the moral consciousness...Public 
indignation is the prototype of moral disapproval, and public 
approval the prototype of moral approbation. And these public 
emotions are characterised by generality, individual 
disinterestedness and apparent impartiality. Thus moral 
disapproval is at the bottom of the concepts bad, vice, and wrong; 
whilst moral approval has led to the concepts good, virtue and 
merit.12  
 
Westermarck's clear style, detailed examples, and readiness to 
enter into detailed disputation with other philosophers whom he 
believed were not seeing the problems with sufficient clarity, led him to 
be widely reviewed, both by academic colleagues such as Hobhouse or 
Marett who wrote the review in Mind, but also in the press as well, such 
Nature, the Athenaeum, Scotsman, and Yorkshire Post.13 It then appears to 
have fallen largely from view until taken up from philosophy by 
Timothy Stroup many decades later, who has written a detailed analysis 
of his thought, and stimulated a parallel collection of essays, both 
published in 1982. Things then appear to go quiet again, though there 
is further interest today from a group of young Finnish scholars writing 
in English, and it is likely that he will become more prominent in the 
next decade.14 
Westermarck himself cites a myriad of sources for his work, both 
ethnographic and philosophical. For Stroup, however, the principle 
influences can be reduced to four: David Hume, Adam Smith, Frazer, 
and Darwin.15 From Hume, Westermarck borrowed the crucial insight 
that at the heart of morals lies an emotional reaction. Westermarck is 
even more enthusiastic concerning Adam Smith, of whom he writes:  
 
I maintain that Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments is the 
most important contribution to moral psychology made by any 
British thinker, and that it is so in the first place on account of the 
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emphasis it lays on the retributive character of the moral 
emotions.16  
 
Indeed, the opening lines of Smith's Theory show immediately just how 
much Westermarck has drawn from him: 
 
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some 
principles in his nature which interest him in the fortune of others, 
and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives 
nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity 
or compassion, the emotion we feel for the misery of others...The 
greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society is 
not altogether without it.17 
 
In the way that he sets his wider arguments, Westermarck is 
sometimes dismissed as a typical evolutionist.18 It is true that the 
influence of Darwin is very strong, and has to be taken account in order 
to appreciate fully the approach that he is taking. The quality of 
empathy is, for Westermarck innate, something that is potentially part 
of the biological make up of Homo sapiens. In turn, he assumes that 
there is an evolutionary advantage to human groups which are able to 
make that identification with each other, for it is equally essential to co-
operation as a group or as a family. The question, in turn, as to why this 
empathic quality should be present in human beings is not one that he 
feels is troubling to his argument. Given we have this capacity to 
socialise and to identify mutually with one another at all, he feels that 
he has demonstrated its importance to moral behaviour.  Stroup offers 
the following summary, which I think can hardly be bettered: 
 
As a result of our likes and dislikes, together with our propensity to 
sympathise (which has altruistic overtones) and the beliefs we have 
about matters of fact, we approve or disapprove of certain 
intentions in others and in ourselves, and this, when contemplated 
from a disinterested, impartial and general viewpoint, causes us to 
apply predicates of moral approval or disapproval to the agent who 
has the intentions.19 
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If the roots of Westermarck's thoughts are clear, what of his 
present eclipse? That he is ignored, and I think unjustly, there is little 
doubt. That is not to say that he is not occasionally mentioned. He is.  
However, he does not inhabit that central position that he deserves in 
our understanding. Excluding him from the canonical understanding of 
important anthropological thinkers means in turn, that he is not taken 
into account in the recent literature on anthropology and morals. For 
example, we may take the otherwise fascinating volume edited by 
Monica Heintz, which appeared first in 2009. Nearly all its respective, 
and distinguished, authors state variously that the study of 
anthropology and morality is new. Rather than set the anthropological 
study of morality into its Enlightenment context, to which 
Westermarck clearly belongs, they assume that is in some way linked to 
the emergence of post-modernism reflexivity, and only a few decades 
old. Heintz, for example, in her introduction writes 'Can we preserve in 
our writings the dignity of other cultures even though we may perhaps 
- as individuals - disapprove of their values? These delicate questions 
lurk in postmodernist debates.'20 Having made that assumption, almost 
every chapter regards the history of such anthropological enquiries as 
having a different starting point: almost invariably recent.  
Why should this historical myopia be so acute? It appears to me to 
be dependent largely on the way that the editors, and the authors, 
approach the question of why they have become drawn to the study of 
morality. For Westermarck, relativism of morals is a factual matter that 
can be discerned through research and explained in ways that he would 
call scientific. Thus, for him the truth is simply that there is, in the 
world, no one moral way of doing things, and any universalist 
proposition, such as those put forward by Spencer or Mills, is not 
tenable for the reason that it is contradicted by the available facts which 
he, Westermarck, has marshalled. Thus, the relativism of Westermarck 
and the relativism of post-modernism apparently derive from quite 
different starting points: the one dependent on a single truth, the other 
denying its possibility.21 It is hardly likely then, that those who regard 
relativity as emerging from a post-modern uncertainty with the 
existential status of reality should take as their starting point a text 
which appears at least to have a form of evolutionary positivism as its 
inspirational framework.  
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Even if this is the case, it leaves us with a further problem. It 
doesn't explain a rather long gap: Westermarck's work appeared in 
1906, it appears to have fallen out of favour long before the emergence 
of post-modernism. Here, there the possibility of some assistance, 
however from the well-known Malinowski lecture by Laidlaw entitled 
'For an anthropology of ethics and freedom'. His starting point, it will 
be recalled, is that the influence of Durkheim inhibited the appreciation 
of the individual: “Durkheim's conception of the social so completely 
identifies the collective with the good that an independent 
understanding of ethics appears neither necessary nor possible.”22  
From the point of view of the chronology of the disappearance of 
Westermarck, this certainly fits: he appears to have fallen out of favour 
with the emergence of structural-functionalism, which already in his 
Huxley Lecture in 1936 he regards with some distaste as the 'new 
anthropology'.23 It is also absolutely the case that Westermarck himself 
regarded Durkheim as being in certain respects incompatible with his 
theory. However, there is perhaps a further underlying reason for the 
rapid eclipse.  By the time that Durkheim has been incorporated into 
British social anthropology through Radcliffe-Brown, anthropology 
itself had shifted position so that it regarded itself as practicing a form 
of induction.24 This, with its easy assumption of access to external 
reality makes it appear sharply contrasting to the later sophistication of 
post-modernism. Westermarck has been tarred, repeatedly, with the 
same brush.  
Yet, Westermarck is not quite as straight-forward as this. Though 
he certainly believes that there is a reality, and that there can be such a 
thing as rational thought, in fact his approach to social life is 
constructivist. 25  This, combined with his readiness to offer clear, 
succinct hypotheses that are amenable to falsification means that he is 
in fact very close to a form of Popperian deductivism before his time. 
Not just this. Westermarck's exploration of morals and individuality 
contains at the same time a social prescription. He believes, just as 
Popper in the Open Society, that through understanding the social basis 
of ethics and morals, it is possible for the thinking - or the rational actor 
- to escape society's coils. How we are in practice to achieve that 
separation from the social life that has in the first place constituted our 
own ethical understanding he does not make clear, but he believes that 
it is possible. In other words, for Westermarck his moral enquiry is 
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ultimately about individual freedom: the way that the individual actor 
can escape the moral pressures that society imposes upon them through 
rational reflection.  
 
Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I argue several connected points. I suggest, at its simplest 
level, that we need to talk not about the Malinowski seminar but the 
anthropology seminars at the LSE. Only then can we gain a nuanced 
understanding of the multi-stranded way that modern anthropology 
was formed. I suggest further that there is more than one kind of 
relativism, or rather that relativism can emerge from different 
philosophical positions, and that we need to take this into account when 
we look at the history of our discipline's approach to anthropology and 
morals.  
Westermarck, in his readiness to look back at the great moral 
thinkers of the Enlightenment, whilst at the same time being a 
pioneering anthropologist, acts as a bridge between the two streams of 
thought in major, scintillating works which repay as careful study today 
as they did at the time that they were written.  It is fitting that at this 
decennial conference, which precisely attempts to draw a juxtaposition 
of these two themes, that we should celebrate his name, and I thank you 
for giving me the opportunity of doing so. 
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Footnotes 
                                                
1 Reader in Anthropology, University of Bristol. Director, Royal Anthropological 
Institute. E-mail: d.p.shankland@bris.ac.uk. 
2 Of many possible instances, see Kroeber’s disapprobatory comments in his 
History of Ethnological Theory “With Westermarck the reader has the 
uncomfortable feeling that nothing interests him less than to comprehend 
primitive tribes…Sweeping generalizations of his, chosen here and there, will 
illustrate his ethnographic inadequacy….” (1937: 97). More recently, see the 
comments by Barth ‘Neither [ie. Westermarck and Seligman] was theoretically 
innovative; only Malinowski represented the new anthropology’. Barth (2005: 20). 
As an exception to this, we may note Douglas (1998), which contains a very 
interesting discussion of Westermarck’s position on ethical relativity. 
3 For introductory works: Westermarck’s place in anthropology, Stroup (ed) 
1982a; Shankland (ed) 2014, esp. Intro. For his place in philosophy see Stroup 
(1982b). For his life, and place in Finnish intellectual thought, see as well as the 
aforementioned the recent work by Lagerspetz, Suolinna, and Bruun (2014).  
4 For a recent statement, see Wolf (2014).  
5 This was published as Pro Finlandia (1899). See also Laperspetz (2014), and 
Lagerspetz, Suolinna, and Bruun (2014). 
6 See for instance, Gellner (1995: 235-6) or Handler (1985; 684). 
7 Bourdieu (1977). 
8 For instance, his Wit and Wisdom in Morocco A Study of Native Proverbs (1930) 
was published as being by Edward Westermarck “with the assistance of Shereef 
‘Abd-es- SalamEl-Baqqali”.  
9 Westermarck (1936). 
10 This point is discussed in a little more detail in Shankland (2014: intro). See also 
Young’s discussion of Westermarck’s influence on Malinowski (2004); Montague’s 
recollection of the seminars (1982), and Malinowski’s own comment on 
Westermarck (1913: 34). Yet again, we may note that he was active in 
anthropological debates in London for nearly three decades, giving a paper for 
example at the large Anthropological Congress organized by Myres in 1934 
[Myres 1934: 269]. His paper to its Section F ‘Survival in Ritual’ is reproduced in 
Shankland (2014: 169-177). 
11  (Westermarck 1906-08: 738). 
12 Westermarck (1906-8: 740). 
13 Extracts from such reviews are frequently quoted from as a form of advertising 
within Westermarck’s publications, for example see the double-sided advert ‘By 
the same author’, following page 422 of Westermarck’s Marriage Ceremonies in 
Morocco (1914).  
14 See Lagerspetz, Suolinna, and Bruun (2014), as well as the relevant chapters in 
Shankland (ed. 2014).  
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15 Stroup (1982b: 126-127). See also Stroup (1984). 
16 Westermarck (1932: 71). 
17 Smith (1759: 1).  
18 Eg. Handler (1985; 684). 
19 Stroup 1982a: 186. 
20 Heinz (2009: ). 
21 On this point, see the essays in Gellner (1985).  
22 Laidlaw (2002: 312). 
23 Westermarck (1936: 248). 
24 There are many ways to demonstrate this: for example it is the position which 
Evans-Pritchard attacks in his famous ‘Social Anthropology past and present’ 
(1950). 
25 On this aspect, see the comments on Westermarck and Hume in Douglas’ ‘How 
institutions think’, (1998: 57-76). 
